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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CORPORATION NINE, a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HAY L. TAYLOR and 
NEYA 'V. TAYLOR, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
RAYL. TAYLOR and 
NEYA ,V. TAYLOR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
CORPORATION NINE, a Utah 
corporation, Defendant-AppeUant. 
Case No. 
12983 
Plaintiff-Appellant Corporation Nine's Brief 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks specific performance of 
the terms of a contract of sale and for interpretation of 
Yarious aspects of the contract and/ or for damages for 
1 
non-performance, together with costs and attorney's 
fees and Dt:fendants-Respondents seek to lrnYe title 
quieted to the property described in the contract of sale 
) 
together with interest, costs and attorney's fees, with 
the cases being consolidated for trial. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
J udgrnent finding the contract price to be as stated 
in the contract, fixing the unpaid principal and method 
of computation of interest, finding Plaintiff-Appellant 
in default, dismissing John "r. New from the lawsuits, 
quieting title with respect to the property under the 
contract remaining unconveyed, awarding no damages, 
and awarding Defendants-Respondents attorney's fees 
and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks an order vacating the 
judgment of forfeiture and termination and award of 
attorney's fees, for an order reinstating the contract and 
an order ordering the Defendants-Respondents to make 
the requested conveyance for money tendered and/ or in 
the alternative damages for improper termination of the 
contract, together with an award of costs and attorney's 
fees. 
STATE1\1:ENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendants made and entered into a 
written contract of purchase dated January 24, 1968 
2 
wherein the Defendants were referred to as the Sellers, 
an<l the Plaintiff was referred to as lluyer, for the sale 
and purchase of approximately 50 acres of raw land 
located East of \Vasatch Boulevard at approximately 
10th South Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
a copy of which is attached to the Complaint on file 
herein, said contract being executed on or about J anu-
ary 30, 1968. (R. 5-11 and Ex. P-1) 
That approximately the same date of the execution 
of the contract of purchase for the 50 acres, the Defend-
ants gave to the Plaintiff, pursuant to a letter dated 
J auuary 30, 1968, the First Right of Refusal to pur-
chase an additional 44.58 acres immediately North and 
adjacent to the property, the subject of said contract. 
That on or about February ti, 1969 the Plaintiff 
and Defendants entered into a Letter of Instructions to 
Security Title Company of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, wherein certain terms of the 
contract of purchase were altered and modified as set 
forth in said Letter of Instructions attached to the Com-
plaint of the Plaintiff herein. (R. 12-14 and Ex. P-5) 
That by the terms of the contract, the sale and pur-
chase price of the 50 acres was a total of $240,000.00, or 
$4,800.00 per acre. The Plaintiff was to pay the sum of 
$20,000.00 as a down payment and was to receive the 
release and conveyance of six ( 6) acres of land by 'Var-
ranty Deed in exchange for the down payment. The con-
tract further provided that Plaintiff would pay the sum 
of $25,000.00 per year commencing with March l, 1969, 
3 
together with interest at the rate of 4% per annum after 
March 1, 1969. Plaintiff, for each $:.:?5,000.00 paid 011 
the principal, was to receive fee title by '"' arranty Deed 
to five ( 5) acres of land contiguous to the previous land 
released, with the full balance of the unconveyed acreage 
described in said contract being released at the end of 
the contract. ( R. 6-7; Ex. P-5) This release provision of 
$5,000.00 per acre allowed the Defendants to stay ahead 
of the Plaintiffs by the sum of $200.00 per acre. 
Although the Plaintiff was to receive six ( 6) acres 
at the time of the down payment, it was determined, and 
verbally agreed upon, that the Plaintiff would receive 
6.567 acres. The extra acreage being needed to round 
out some lots. It was verbally agreed that Plaintiff 
would give Defendants a Promissory Note for the sum 
of $12,835.00 payable in three years with no interest and 
~aid note was properly executed and has been paid. This 
agreement at this time was a verbal modification of the 
contract and with execution of the note made the acre-
age release not 6 acres for $20,000.00, but 6.567 acres 
for $32,835.00 at the time of the execution of the con-
tract. 
The Plaintiff, in the forepart of 1969, was ap-
proached to hold the Utah Home Show for 1969 on a 
portion of the property, the subject of this contract, and 
the Defendants were so advised and consented to same. 
This new development required the release of additional 
acreage and a change on the payments which were 
handled through Security Title Company, pursuant to 
the Letter of Instructions attached to Plaintiff's Com-
4 
plaint. ( R. 1:2-14 and Ex. P-5) It was also determined, 
that because of a Salt Lake County requirement for 
drainage, an additional 1.180 acres would be needed to 
handle said drainage for the subdivision. This 1.180 
acres being outside of the contract description, but on 
the 44.58 acres owned by the Defendants adjacent to 
the contract description and for which the Plaintiff had 
First Right of Refusal. (Def. Dep. Ex. D-6) The De-
fendants retained a drainage easement on said 1.18 
acres. The parties discussed the handling of the 1.18 
acres as to whether it should be considered part of the 
contract or as a separate matter and it did not seem to 
matter to either of them to a great extent. Plaintiff later 
verbally asked that the 1.18 acres be considered part of 
the 50 acres purchased and the Defendants verbally 
agreed. (Def. Dep. P. 31, 45; Pl. Dep. P. 38-39 and 65) 
On or about February 6, 1969 some 14.248 acres 
were conveyed with payments being made of $30,900.00 
on February 17, 1969, $22,250.00 on October 9, 1969 
and $18,090.00 on January 7, 1970, thereby making a 
total payment on the contract to January 7, 1970 of 
$104<,075.00 with a total of 20.815 acres having been 
com·eyed to the Plaintiff to this date. The above pay-
ments in effect prepaid the contract and no payments 
were made on the principal of the contract for 1970, 
except the $18,090.00 paid on January 7, 1970. No other 
principal payments were made for the reason that the 
annual payments were prepaid, the parties verbally 
agreed that none need be made, and for the further rea-
son that the Defendant did not want any more money. 
5 
tached to the Complaint of the Plaintiff (R. 15-16) an<l 
a copy of the Taylor-Young contract attached to the 
deposition of Ray L. Taylor on file herein and which 
was published at the hearing in the lower court. (Def. 
Dep. Ex 2) 
Notwithstanding the sale to Young, the Defend-
ants notified the Plaintiff in January, 1971 that they 
had a sale for a portion of the 44.58 acres which the 
Plaintiff had First Right of Refusal on, and upon in-
vestigation it was found that this sale was not a valid sale 
and nothing arose from this alleged transaction. 
In February, 1971 Defendants requested improper 
interest and principal on the unpaid balance of the con-
tract and interest on the interest free note balance at 
which time Plaintiff seriously started to check interest, 
etc. pertaining to said request and found them to be 
wrong. On March 24, 1971, and within the grace period 
set out in the contract, the Plaintiff relying on Def end-
ants' past representations and in accordance with its 
understanding and in reliance on the Defendants' repre-
sentations, forwarded its check No. 2156 in the sum of 
$9,197.00 to cover the March 1, 1971 interest and prin-
cipal payments. (Ex. P-15) Plaintiff sent a legal de-
scription of 0.752 acres prepared by Bush & Gudgell, 
Inc. which represented the balance of the ground that 
Plaintiff was entitled, per the contract, upon the pay-
ment mentioned above. This description was contiguous 
to the property previously released and transferred and 
was needed by the Plaintiff to proceed with the develop-
8 
ment of the cluster type homes as the propery had been 
rezoned for such purposes. The above payment was cal-
culated as follows: 
Acres 
Date Conveyed Date Payments Received 
~/1/68 6 .. 567 :2/19/68 $ 20,000.00 Cash 
12,835.00 Promissory 
Note 
~1u/HD U.:248 :2117169 30,900.00 Cash 
------------ IOI 9/69 22,250.00 Cash 
------------ II 7170 18,090.00 Cash 
Totals :20.815 acres released $104,075.00 Paid 
Contract 
Total 50.000 acres 240,000.00 (per 
contract) 
Bal. :L!J.185 acres ( unconveyed) $135,925.00 (Due) 
Total payments required under the contract: 
Down Payment $20,000.00 
3/1/69 25,000.00 
3/J/70 25,000.00 
311/71 25,000.00 
Total payments made per above 
excluding Promissory Note 
Balance of principal due 3/J/71 
Accrued interest 3/1/70 to 3/J/71 
at 4% on $135,925.00 
Total Due 3/I/71 
9 
$95,000.00 
91,240.00 
$ 3,760.00 
5,437.00 
$ 9,197.00 
The foregoing check was returned and Plaintiff 
deposited a Cashier's Check into court in the above 
amount and it has remained ever since until the appeal, 
at which time the parties stipulated same, or so much 
thereof as may be needed for a Supersedeas Bond in 
connection with this appeal, may remain and the balance 
returned to the Plaintiff. 
Upon Defendants refusal to accept said check and 
further upon their refusal to convey the 0.752 acres as 
requested, the Plaintiff instituted its action, Case No. 
198780, seeking specific performance of the terms of the 
contract of sale between the parties and/ or for damages 
for non-performance together with costs and attorney's 
fees. Defendants at a later date instituted their action, 
Case No. 198934, seeking to have title quieted to the 
property in question, together with interest, costs and 
attorney's fees. The two cases at the pretrial, were con-
solidated for trial. 
There is no real issue as to the amounts of payment, 
the dates of payment and the amount of acreage re-
leased. The original contract has been altered and/ or 
amended innumerable times by the parties beginning 
with the inception of the contract, all of which has been 
done verbally with the exception of the Letter of In-
structions. In other words, the parties made up their own 
contract as they went along until they had a falling out. 
There is now a dispute as to whether the total acreage 
sold was 50.00 acres plus the 1.18 acres, or whether the 
1.18 acres can be considered part of the contract, as to 
10 
whether or 11ot the contract price amou11ts to $250,000.00 
rather than $240,000.00 as shown in the contract, 
whether or not the sale price is $5,000.00 per acre, rather 
than $4,800.00 per acre as calculated by the contract, 
"bet her or not there has been prepayments of the annual 
payments, as to calculatio11 of interest, conveyances, etc. 
The basic relative positions are set out in the pretrial 
order. ( R. 35-41) 
ARG lJ .JIEN T 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED HY 
THEIR O\VN COL'HSE OF CONDCCT TO RE-
FCSE ACCEPTANCE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
TEXDEH OF PAY.MENT. 
111 the case at bar, the ink was hardly dry before the 
parties started to amend the terms of the original con-
tract and they continued to amend it throughout from 
January, 1968 to 1971 and right up to the time they had 
a "falling out'', all of such amendments being oral with 
the exception of the Letter of Instructions. A few of 
such amendments are as follows: 
(a) The contract callec.l for six ( 6) acres to be 
released for the $20,000.00 down payment, yet 
H.567 acres were released but the Plaintiff had to 
pay $32,835.00 to get same. 
( b) Acreage was to be released after the first six 
( 6) acres on a basis of five ( 5) acres for every 
11 
$25,000.00 paid, yet some 14.248 acres were re-
leased for the payment of $30,900.00 on February 
17, 1969, and no acreage for the payment of $22,-
250.00 on October 9, 1969, and no acreage for the 
payment of $18,090.00 on January 7, 1970. 
( c) No principal payment was made on .March I, 
1970. 
( d) The 1970 and part of the 1971 payments 
were prepaid without complete written authority. 
( e) The Defendants charged interest on the 
$12,835.00 Promissory Note when the Note on its 
face did not call for interest. 
( f) The Defendants charged interest on $250,-
000.00 on the contract which was not agreed to and 
the contract did not call for that amount as the con-
tract price was $240,000.00. 
( g) The Defendants released 1.18 acres of land 
outside the legal description of the contract and 
subsequently changed their minds as to the inclu-
sion of same in the terms of the contract. 
(h) The Defendants were given a drainage ease-
ment on the 1.18 acreage. 
( i) The Plaintiff was charged and paid penalty 
interest on interest. 
The foregoing are but a few of the modifications 
and is evidence that the parties made up their own con-
tract or contracts as they went along. 
12 
It is true that a simple contract completely reduced 
to writing cannot be contradicted, changed, or modified 
by parol evidence of what was said and done by the par-
ties to it at the time it was made; the very purpose of the 
writing is to render the agreement more certain and to 
exclude parol evidence of it. Nevertheless, by the rules 
of the common law, it is competent for the parties to a 
simple contract in writing, before any breach of its pro-
visions, altogether to waive, dissolve, or abandon it, or 
to add to, change, or modify it, or vary or nulif y its 
terms, and thus make it a new one. The reason for this is 
that simple contracts, whether written or otherwise, are, 
in the absence of a statute changing the rule, of the same 
dignity in contemplation of law, and therefore the writ-
ten contract may be changed, modified, or waived in 
whole or in part by subsequent one, express, written, 
oral, or implied. 1'eal v. Bilby, 123 US 572, 31 Led 263, 
8 S Ct 239; Chesapeake~ 0. Canal Co. v. Ray, 101 US 
522, 25 L ed 792; Hawkins v. US, 96 US 689, 24 L ed 
607, 17 Am. J ur 2nd Sec. 466 Contracts. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Davis v. Payne and 
Day, Inc. cited in IO Utah 2d 53, 348 P2d 337 says: 
Parties to written contracts may modify, waive, or make 
new terms notwithstanding terms in the contract de-
signed to hamper such freedom. See also Dillman v. 
Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P2d 296. 
Our court in Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction 
Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P2d 985 said: The fact 
that parties have a written contract on a subject does not 
prevent them from entering into other agreements re-
13 
lating to the same general subject matter and held that 
the evidence supported a finding that in addition to the 
written contract pursuant to which Plaintiff was to fur-
nish aggregate for highway construction parties had 
separate agreement pursuant to which Plaintiff was to 
perform and be paid for other services. Our court in 
McCarren v. Merrill cited in 15 Utah :2d 179, 389 P2d 
732 said that where a contract calling for installation ot' 
plumbing work by plaintiff in defendant's apartment 
house for a fixed sum was silent as to time of payment, 
enforcement of oral agreement that payment was to be 
made each month for work completed during the month 
was proper. See also 17 Am Jur :2nd Sec 465 Contracts. 
It is evident from the above Utah Case Law and 
the facts, the record, and depositions in the instant case, 
that the Plaintiff through the course of conduct of the 
Defendants has been induced to change its positiou as t~ 
advance payments and moneys due, and that there has 
been an equitable estoppel. 
Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, is a term 
applied usually to a situation where, because of some-
thing which he has done or omitted to do, a party is de-
nied the right to plead or prove an otherwise important 
fact. Peterson v. Ogden City, Ill Utah 125, 176 P2d 
599. 
The most comprehensive definition of equitable 
estoppel in pais is that it is the principle by which a party 
who knows or should know the truth is absolutely pre-
cluded, both at law and in equity, from denying, or as-
14 
serting the contrary of, auy material fact which, by his 
words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally 
or through culpable negligence, he has induced another, 
who was excusably ignoraut of the true facts and who 
had a right to rely upon such words or cuuduct, to believe 
and act upon them thereby, as a cousequence reasonably 
to be anticipated, changing his position in such a way 
that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary 
assertion was aliowed. Public Utilities Com. v. Jones, 
j4 Utah 111, l 7U P 745. See also 28 Am J ur 2d Sec 27 
Estuppel and Waiver. 
Equitable estoppel 1s bottomed upon the notion 
that, when one person makes representations to another 
which warrant the latter in acting in a given way, the 
one making such representations will nut be permitted 
to cha11ge his position when such change would bring 
about inequitable consequences tu the other person, who 
relied on representations and acted thereon in good 
faith, and the representations made must be in them-
selves sufficient tu warrant the action taken, and their 
sufficiency is a judicial question. Farmers and Mer-
chant Bank v. Cnivcrsal C.l.T. Cr. Corp., 4 Utah 2d 
155, 289 P2d 1045. Under doctrine of estoppel in pais 
one may by his acts or conduct away from court prevent 
himself from denying in court the effect or results of 
those acts. Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2<l 441, 464 P2d 
598. 
"Promissory estoppel" relates primarily to those in-
formal contracts which lack consideration but where, 
15 
because of surrounding facts, injustice can only be 
avoided by enforcing the promise. Easton v. JV ycuff, 4 
Utah 2d 38(), :295 P:2d 332. Loss should fall on him who 
created circumstances from which it resulted, where one 
of two innocent parties must suffer a loss. Hanson v. 
Beehive Security Company, 14 Utah :2d 157, 380 P2d 
66. 
Our Supreme Court in V-1 Oil Company v. Anclwr 
Petroleum Company cited in 8 Utah 2<l 349, 384 P2d 
760 said: Where defendant proposed to supply to plain-
tiff certain number of gallons of gas per month and a 
minimum quantity subject to change by mutual contract 
and plaintiff signed it and returned it with a letter stat-
ing that the plaintiff was going to be a little slow in 
starting, but was sure it could use the total commitment 
in the next year, and plaintiff talked by telephone ex-
plaining that it could not meet the minimum require-
ments and defendant replied that it was of no import-
ance, the letter, telephone conversation and defendant's 
conduct, in supplying the plaintiffs commitments, ab-
sent any further evidence, sufficed to spell out a modi-
fied contract by which the defendant agreed to go alo1;g 
with the plaintiff. The Utah Court in Petty v. Gindy 
Manufacturing Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P2d 30 
further said: Doctrine of promissory estoppel is resorted 
to only where circumstances are such that equity and 
good conscience render its application imperative in 
order to avoid an obvious unfairness and injustice. 
Generally the doctrine of estoppel in pais is found-
ed upon principles of morality and fair dealing and 1s 
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iuleucled to subsene the ends of justice. Gas Service Co. 
['. Consolidated Gas V tilit ies Corp., 145 Kan. 423, 65 
p ~d 584, citing R.C.L.; Bru~,ha v. Huard of Education, 
.n Okla 595, 139 P 2!J8, L.Il.A. HHuC, 233. See also 19 
Am J ur Sec. 42 Estoppel. 
'fhe doctrine of equitable estoppel is frequeutl¥ 
applied to transactions in which it would be unconscion-
able to permit a person to maintain a position inconsist-
ent with one in which he, or those by whose acts he is 
bound, has acquiesced. 1llatthews v. Brown, 148 Ark. 
11~, 229 S.\V. 731, citing R.C.L.; Divide Cmud ~Res­
ervoir Co. t'. Tenney, 57 Colo 14, 13!) P 1110, Ann. Cas. 
1917D, 34u; Re Great JV cstern Beet Sugar Co., 22 
Idaho :328, 125 P 799, 43 L.R.A. ( N .S.) 671; State ex 
rel Frnnks v. Corvallis State Bank, 84 .l\Iont 297, 275 
P ~65, citing R.C.L.; Terry v. Haynes, GO Okla 34, 158 
P 1195, citing R.C.L. A party may be estopped to insist 
upon a claim, assert an objection, or take a position 
which is inconsistent with an admission which he has pre-
viously made and in reliance upon which the other party 
has changed his position. Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah 
62, 88 P (l96, IO L.R.A. ( N.S.) 404. Estoppel is fre-
quently based upon the acceptance and retention by one 
haYing knowledge or notice of the facts, of benefits from 
a transaction, contract, instrument, regulation, or statute 
which he might haYe rejected or contested. Moss v. 
Summitt County, 60 Vtah 252, 208 P 507, 26 A.L.R. 
206. See also 19 Am J ur Sec 62-64 Estoppel. 
111 applying the principles as set forth in the above 
cases and law to the instant case, it is readily discernible 
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that an equitable estoppel must be enforced. The parties 
had dealt with each other for many years last past ( R 
244) , they had changed the written contract, after mak-
ing it, many times from the very inception of same, the 
times and amounts of the payment of the principal and 
interest had not complied with the terms of the written 
contract whatsoever (Ex. D-19) ; the Defendants had 
indicated they did not want more principal for the year 
1970 and that prepayments had been made; the releases 
of ground as set forth in the written contract had not 
been complied with whatsoever, Plaintiff did not have 
any releases of ground in 1970 and only asked for 0.752 
acres to be released with the 1971 tender to complete 
cluster type development and this request complied with 
the $5,000.00 release clause; Plaintiff has expended 
large sums of money to develop the subdiYision with in-
stallation of water, sewer, gas, power, drainage, and 
other off site improvements sufficient to develop the 
balance of the ground; Plaintiff has paid $104,075.00 on 
the contract and has received only 20.815 acres of land 
when the contract calls for 22.815 acres inasmuch as the 
contract says six ( 6) acres shall be released for the $20,-
000.00 down payment and an acre for each $5,000.00 
thereafter, therefore, the Plaintiff would be entitled to 
16.815 acres for the $84,075.00 paid after the $20,000.00 
down payment. Considerable sums have been expended 
for engineering, rezoning, etc., applicable to an orderly 
development; and Plaintiff will be deprived of its profit 
on said development which usually comes at the last 
stages of any subdivision development. It is evident that 
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because of the surrounding facts of this case, it would be 
unconscionable to allow the Defendants to declare a de-
fault inasmuch as the Defendants course of conduct has 
Jed Plaintiff to believe it ha<l prepaid the contract and 
timely tendered what it had been led to believe was the 
proper amount <lue. Equity and good conscience alone 
as well as the very morality of fair dealing make it im-
perative and warrant the application of an equitable 
estoppel in order to avoid an obvious unfairness and in-
justice to the Plaintiff. To allow otherwise would force 
an extreme hardship on the Plaintiff and unjustly en-
rich the Defendants. 
POINT II 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT BREACH OR 
DEFAULT OF THE CONTRACT TO \\TAR-
RANT A FORFEITCRE AND TERMINA-
TION OF THE CONTRACT. 
Although there is some early authority in support 
of the rule that a party must strictly or literally perform 
the stipulations on his part before the other party is 
obligated to perform, unless the promises. are independ-
ent, the modern authorities support a more liberal rule. 
Thus, it is said that the law looks to the spirit of a 
contract and not the letter of it, and that the question 
therefore is not whether a party has literally complied 
with it, but whether he Ins substantially done so. Wood-
ru ff' t'. Ho-uyh, 91 es 59Ci, 23 L ed 332; Atowich v. 
limrner, :218 Cal 7ti:3, ~5 P~d (); 1st Olympic Corp. v. 
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Hawryluk, 185 Cal App 2d 832, 8 Cal Rptr 728; Har-
rild v. Spokane School Dist., 112 \Vash 266, 192 P 1, 
19 A.L.R. 811. See also 17 A ni J ur 2d Sec 37 5 Con-
tracts. This has long been the rule in equity. Green v. 
Covillaud, 10 Cal 317; Harrild v. Spokane School Dist., 
supra. Accordingly, the courts now state that substan-
tial, and not exact, performance accompanied by good 
faith is all the law requires in the case of any contract 
to entitle a party to recover on it. In the instant case the 
Plaintiff tendered and asked for a release of land on 
what it had been led to believe was the proper amount, 
both as to payment and release of land, therefore, it has 
substantially complied with the amended terms of the 
contract. 
Forfeitures of contracts and rights thereunder are 
not favored by the law; rather such forfeitures are re-
garded with disfavor, and are abhorred by the courts. 
It is well settled that forfeitures by implication or by 
construction, not compelled by express requirements, 
are regarded with disfavor, and that contracts involving 
a forfeiture cannot be extended beyond the strict and 
literal meaning of the words used. Since forfeitures are 
not favored either in equity or in law, provisions for 
forfeitures are to receive, where the intent is doubtful, 
a strict construction against those for whose benefit they 
are introduced. Courts are reluctant to declare and 
enforce a forfeiture if by reasonable construction it 
can be avoided. Petersen v. Hodges, 12lUtah 72, 239 
P2d 180. See also 17 Am J ur 2nd Sec. 499-500 Con-
tracts. Forfeitures are enforced only where there is the 
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dearc:st evi<lc:uce that that was what was meant by the 
~Lipulation of lhe parties, aud there must be no cast 
of management or trickery to entrap a party into a 
forfeiture. Before forf e1ture can occur, it must be clear 
that the parties intended to provide for it in the contract 
under which it is attempted to enforce it; and where 
the contract is revocable at the pleasure of either party, 
without condition expressed, a penalty of forfeiture 
cannot be enforced against either party making the 
revocation. 17 Am J ur 2nd Sec. 500, supra. 
Forfeitures are odious to the law, 1llorgan v. Sor-
e11so11, :3 C tah 2d .J.28, 286 P2d 229, and equity is loath 
to enforce a forfeiture, especially when refusal to do 
so gives all parties to agreement every right to which 
they are entitled and thus works no hardship upon 
anyone. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Invest-
rnent Co., 3 Utah 2<l 121, 279 P2d 709. Language pur-
porting to authorize forfeitures should be strictly con-
strued and it cannot be declared on general or merely 
related defalcations. Junes v. Thorvaldson, 15 Utah 2d 
308, 392 P2d .J.3. 
Court will refuse to enforce forfeiture of amounts 
paid under real estate contract only if circumstances 
are such that if forfeiture were applied it would be 
so grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view 
of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties 
that it would shock conscience of court of equity. 
Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P2d 673, citing 
Malmbcry v. Bauyh, ti2 lTtah 331, 218 P 975; Croft v. 
Jensen, 86 Ptah 13, .J.O P2d 198; Young v. Hansen, 
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117 Utah 591, 218 P2d 666; Perli:in,s v. Spencer, 121 
Utah 468, :243 P2d 446; Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 
59, 278 P2d 294; Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 
P2d 623; Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P2d 
396. 
In applyiug the foregoiug rules of law to the iustaut 
case, certainly if the parties have co11ti11ually altered 
the contract and the Defendants led the Plaintiff to so 
alter its position to rely on advance payments, releases, 
etc., and the Plaintiff timely tendered the payment 
and made request for release in accordance with the 
mutual understanding, then there should not be any 
hardship worked on the Defendants. Furthermore, 
the Plaintiff should at least be given the opportunity 
to have the contract reinstated as a forfeiture under 
the circumstances would shock the conscience of a court 
of equity. One cannot declare a forfeiture of a contract 
where he himself is materially in default. H uyyins v. 
Green Top Dairy Farms, Inc., 75 Idaho 436, 273 P:M 
399. Here the Defendants had, on October 29, 1970, 
sold the same property to Jerry Sherman Young (Def. 
Dep. Ex. D-3) and upon proper tender by the Plain-
tiff with the money computed as understood to be due 
and request for conveyance of 0. 7 52 acres the De-
fendant was unable to perform. A forfeiture will be 
enforced only where the party seeking the forfeiture 
has strictly performed his contractual obligations ac-
cording to the letter. Covington v. Ba~ich Bros. Constr., 
72 Ariz. 280, 233 P2d 837. If it plainly appears that 
vendor has so lost or incumbered his ownership or his 
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contract he carn10t insist th:J.t purchaser continue to 
111ake payments when it is obYious that his own perform-
ance will not be forthcommg and it is alleged that De-
fendants were unable to perform at the time the tender 
was timely made. 1rl arlowe Investment Corp. v. Rad-
mall, 26 U tab 2d 124, 485 P2d 1402. 
POINT Ill 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DA.MAGES 
IF THE CONTRACT IS FORFEITED OR 
TERl\IIN ATED. 
The Yiew has beeu taken that a party who puts it 
out of his power to perform a contract before the time 
fixed for performance commits a breach rendering him 
liable to pay damages. Lovell v. St. Louis Jlut. L. Ins. 
Co., 111 US 264, 28 L ed 423, 4 S Ct. 390; Re N elf 
(C.A. 6) 157 F 57. See also Restatement of Contracts 
Sec. 318. In the case at bar the Defendants had sold 
the same property to Jerry Sherman Young and there-
fore were unable to conyey any property to the Plain-
tiff upon request, and did not convey the 0.752 acres 
when requested because of the inability to do so. 
The weight of authority appears to be that the 
party prevented from performing is at liberty to treat 
the contract as broken and abandon it and recover dam-
agse for the breach. Anvil 1llin. Co. v. Humble, 153 
es 540, 38 L ed 814, 14 S. Ct. 876. In other words, 
such party may regard it as terminated and demand 
whateyer damages he has sustained thereby. U.S. v. 
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Behan, llO US 338, 28 L ed 168, 4 S. Ct. 81; U.S. v. 
Peck, 102 US o.J., 2o L ed .J.u. Stated a little differently 
it might be said that it is the rule that where one party 
is unable to perform his part of the contract, he caunot 
be entitled to the performance of the contract by the 
other party. 1'aylur V. 1llason, 9 vVheat (us) 325, 6 
L ed 101; Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall (US) 304, 
1 L ed 391; Edge1ton v. Taylor, 184 NC 571, 115 SE 
156. <{See also 17 Am J ur 2d Sec. 355 Contracts. 
'Vhere one party to a contract has incapacitated 
himself to perform his part thereof, there is no need of 
the other coming forward to make tender of perform-
ance. Austin v. Vanderbilt, 48 Or 206, 85 P 519. Here 
the Plaintiff went further and timely tendered the 
amount required by the verbally amended contract, 
requested conveyance, but Defendants didn't convey 
because they had sold the property elsewhere. 
If failure of one party to perform his duties under 
contract results in damage to the other party, latter is 
entitled to recover for breach of contractual duties. 
State Automobile & Cas. Under. v. Salisbury, 27 Utah 
2d 229, 494 P2d 529. The non-breaching party should 
receive award which will put him in as good a position 
as he would have been in had there been no breach of 
contract. Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 2.3 
Utah 2d 1, 455 P2d 197, and damages are not to be 
denied simply because they cannot be ascertained with 
exactness. If reasonable basis of calculation of damages 
is afforded, it is sufficient although the result is only 
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approximate. Security Development Company v. 
Feclco., J nc., iB L' tah id 30ti, 462 P2d 706. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Sprague v. Boyies 
Bro~. Drilling Cu., 4 Ctah 2d 344, i94 P2d 689, said: 
Where one party to contract, has failed or refused to 
perform some obligation under it, contract may still 
remain in force and, even though it does, wronged party 
may be excused from further performance and recover 
for loss occasioned tu him. Here the contract called 
for conveyances upon payment and by the very terms 
of the contract written or verbally amended the De-
fendants specified there were no encumbrances on 
the property except a mortgage and then while the 
contract was in full force and effect and even prior to 
the due date, of what now turns out to be a disputed 
amount, the Defendants sold the exact same property 
to someone else and put themselves under such a dis-
ability that they could not and did not convey the 
property requested. Therefore, the Defendants should 
be liable in damages as stated in the Compalint (R 
1-4) if the contract is forfeited or tenninated, as the 
Defendants can't have their cake and eat it both. As-
~uming for sake of argument, that Defendants could 
have cancelled the Young contract there has been a 
frustration of purpose of object of the contract by 
the Defendants' actions. In a case where performance 
had not become impossible, but achievement of the 
object or purpose of the contract was frustrated the 
defensive doctrine applied has been variously desig-
nated as that of "frustration" of the purpose or object 
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of the contract or "commercial frustration." Lloyd v. 
llf urphy, 25 Cal 2d 48, 153 P2d 47, which would even 
be grounds for non-performance on the part of Plain-
tiffs. However, Plaintiff having expended considerable 
swns made a timely and proper tender and was refused 
performance by the Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
It is readily discernible from the pleadings, depo-
sitions, exhibits, and in fact the entire record, that be-
cause of the parties' past association and the method 
of handling the transactions, that the written contract, 
subsequent to execution, was orally amended almost 
every time any payment was due or made, or any prop-
erty released. In fact from its very inception, as the 
down payment was orally changed from $20,000~to 
$32,835.00, there were 6.567 acres released at the time 
the contract was executed rather than 6.00 acres, and 
the Plaintiff, instead of getting 6.00 acres for $20,000.00 
had to pay $32,835.00 and the payments were prepaid 
both by written and oral agreement. It would be safe 
to say that innumerable new contracts or amendmnts 
to the old contract were orally made through the period 
from the date of contract until the time suit was filed. 
It is further readily discernible that the Plaintiff, 
through the course of conduct of the Defendants, has 
been induced to change its position as to amounts due 
and as to advance payments and in reliance thereof 
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there has been an equitable esloppel and the terms of 
the contract muddied accordingly. That it would be 
unmoral and unconscionable to permit the Defendants 
to declare a furf eiture or termination of the contraict 
iri question awl be unjustly enriched to the extent of 
<lepriving the Plamtiff of its profiit from the rest of 
the subdivision, to receive the benefits of the offsite 
improvements installed an<l the better rewning obtained 
for the beneti t of the rest of the property under con-
tract, to reap some :j;700.00 per acre profit on the con-
tract entered into with Jerry Sherman Young on the 
remaining approximate :JO acres that are unconveyed 
when the Plaintiff's and Defendants contract was not 
in default. Equity and good conscience alone as well 
as the very morality of fair dealing make it imperative 
and warrant the application of an equitable estoppel 
in order to avoid an obYious unfairness and injustice 
to the Plaintiff. To allow otherwise would, as indicated 
above, force an extreme hardship on the Plaintiff and 
unjustly enrich the Defendants. 
llased upon the facts, circumstances, and the 
record in this case, the judgment of the lower court 
should be vacated, the contract reinstated and declared 
in full force and effect with the Plaintiff afforded a 
reasonable time to bring the contract current for the 
payment due since the lawsuits were filed, and the De-
fendants ordered to convey the property due for the 
payment or payments made or to be made, together 
with an award for costs and attorney's fees. In the alter-
nath·e, if the Defendants have so jeopardized them-
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selves as to the inability to convey the property then 
the case should be remanded for the assessment of dam-
ages, costs and attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VICTOR G. SAGERS 
7321 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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